Jack Manno506, Gail Krantzberg507
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between Canada and the United States is a model of international cooperation to protect shared water resources. It contains a covenantal component committing the parties to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem and a commitment to adopt an ecosystem approach. Presently the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is under its once-every-six-years formal review called for by the Agreement, which provides an opportunity to revisit its successes and failings, and to imagine new forms and scope of environmental governance for the Great Lakes. This case study summarizes the early history of Great Lakes, their pollution, and their emerging bi-national governance. It explores the promises of the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the growing gap between promise and results, and the current effort to reform and revitalize Great Lakes governance through the review of the Agreement. A consensus is emerging that proposes new models of governance with improved public participation, reformed coordination among the agencies that comprise the Great Lakes regime, the articulation of a strong vision or covenant, inclusion of First Nations/Tribes, and recognition of the special status and associated treaty obligations of both Canada and the United States to effectively include Native perspectives and indigenous knowledge into Great Lakes institutions.
Seen from space, the Great Lakes appear as sparkling jewels strung across the center of North America. The Great Lakes ecosystem is one of the great natural wonders of the world. It is hard to overstate its importance. Nearly one-fifth of the planet’s surface fresh water is stored in and flows through the lakes. One out of every three Canadians and one of every ten United States residents takes her or his drinking water from the Great Lakes. This case study explores the Canada-U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Agreement), the potential it has demonstrated to be a model of Governance for Sustainability, its successes and shortcomings in living up to that potential, and the current efforts to reform and revitalize Great Lakes governance institutions, in particular the 2006–2007 review and possible revision of the Agreement by 2010. The Agreement first signed by President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau in 1972, renewed and revised in 1978, and amended in 1987, has been a major milestone in the history of international environmental governance. It is founded on explicit ecological principles and with a stated purpose to ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem’. It committed the U.S. and Canadian governments to achieving the ‘virtual elimination’ of persistent toxic substances by ending all such discharges into the lakes.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was negotiated pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and British Canada that had created the International Joint Commission (IJC) to help resolve problems including pollution that was causing injury to health or property crossing the binational boarder, The IJC and the institutions added to it in 1972 by the Water Quality Agreement were based on the principle of bi-nationalism (two countries collaborating on achieving a set of shared goals) rather than bi-lateralism (two countries negotiating with each other in an attempt to balance interests and protect each others rights). Participants from both countries serve not as representatives of their nations' or agencies' interests but rather in their personal and profession capacity directed towards the welfare of the ecosystem and the people in it. The IJC and its several expert boards are populated equally by Canadians and Americans. The Agreement sets water quality goals and objectives, but the means to achieve them are left to the environmental laws and regulatory agencies of each country. A complex system of shared governance grew around the IJC involving environmental bureaucrats, government and university-based environmental scientists, professional environmental advocates, business and industry representatives, and interested citizens that by the 1980s could be described as a viable bi-national community. Considerable progress was achieved in reducing pollution discharges into the lakes and thus reducing the levels of priority toxic substances, educating the public, maintaining a flourishing recreational fishing industry, and making it desirable for millions of people around the lakes to once again enjoy the beaches and beautiful sunsets. And yet in December 2005 many of the leading Great Lakes scientists released a stark warning that the lakes were nearing a ‘tipping point’ beyond which lay the likelihood of irreversible ecosystem damage unless urgent action was taken to relieve symptoms of extreme stress from a combination of sources that included toxic contamination, invasive species, nutrient loading, shoreline and upland land use changes and hydrological modifications.508
How did this apparently contradictory situation come to be and how are initiatives exploring options to reform Great Lakes governance so that it can again serve the purpose of Governance for Sustainability? Although a once-every-six-years review is required under the Agreement, no reviews have been completed since 1987. A 2006 decision to review the agreement with the thought of possible revision or re-negotiation has presented the opportunity to revisit the Agreement, examine its successes and failings, and imagine new forms and scope of environmental governance for the Great Lakes. This case study provides the background of the authors' project, funded by the Joyce Foundation, to explore prospects for renewed and revitalized Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River governance.
For at least 6,000 years509 Native communities in the Great Lakes region shaped the landscape with fire to improve conditions for game, built weirs in streams and refined fish-spearing and capture techniques, and developed a highly productive agriculture based on the ecological and nutritional synergies of the varieties of corn, beans and squash that Native horticulturalists had refined over millennia. They traveled by canoe along the lakes and tributaries and trade flourished among the many Native nations within and beyond the Great Lakes basin. At times Native peoples warred for control over resources and at times they developed complex confederations with participatory governance systems, some of which inspired later settlers with an example of cooperation and participatory democracy, an inspiration that in part leads directly to this publication with its impulse to expand governance to include the entire Community of Life.
The arrival of European explorers and missionaries was a catastrophe for the Native peoples throughout the Americas. Diseases for which aboriginal people had no immunity spread rapidly, decimating by some estimates up to 90 percent of the original population and unraveling the web of ecological relationships that had sustained Native nations and their governance. Early arrangements between Europeans and Native peoples included the incorporation of Native trappers and hunters into global commercial networks that served Europe's growing demand for furs, feathers, timber, and other natural resources. By the seventeenth century, following a century of contact, Native agriculture and resource management had greatly diminished. When large-scale European settlement began in the east, it was easy (and politically convenient) for Europeans to see and describe the landscape as a ‘wilderness’, a God-given opportunity to tame and exploit its vast resources. The era of expansion was characterised at first by the struggle between the French economic strategy of resource extraction and export via Great Lakes transport routes and the British strategy of large-scale settlement of the fertile valleys, a conflict the British eventually won. The Native strategy of shifting agriculture and landscape management for seasonal abundance became increasingly difficult to maintain. The French-British wars were followed by revolt of the British colonies in America. In both conflicts, Native people were caught in the middle, their communities and nations divided as to the best strategies for survival. Conflict in the Great Lakes region finally ended after the War of 1812 with the lakes and connecting channels becoming part of the vast boundary between British Canada and the United States. Some Native nations were removed and resettled, others were scattered, and some held on to ever-diminishing territory where they continued to assert their sovereignty (See the Onondaga Land Rights case study in this volume). With peace came a growing economy built on lumber, wheat, iron ore, and other natural resources. New industries depended on water power and increasingly steam engines with wood boilers. Beset by settled agriculture, construction, and wood-burning engines, the forests disappeared. The Great Lakes, the vast freshwater seas, began to show the effects of booming cities with inadequate sanitation, industrial pollution, and ravaged watersheds. Meanwhile dams and canals re-engineered water flow raising tensions on both sides of the border between British Canada and the United States from coast to coast. It was under these conditions that a major innovation in international cooperation in water management, the International Joint Commission, came into being with the signing of the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909. The Boundary Waters Treaty provided the principles and mechanisms to help resolve disputes and to prevent future ones, primarily those concerning water quantity and water quality along the boundary between Canada and the United States.
By the late 1960s the degradation of the Great Lakes was obvious by sight and smell. Routine algal blooms choked the oxygen out of the central basin of Lake Erie. Populations of non-native prey fish, alewife primarily, exploded from the dramatic decline in large predator fish due to overfishing and bio-concentrated dioxin pollution, and washed ashore in rotting wind throws. The Cuyahoga River caught fire. The resulting public outcry led to political pressure for environmental action. Research conducted by IJC- affiliated scientists validated phosphorus as responsible for severe nutrient problems. New environmental legislation was passed in both the United States and Canada, new environmental agencies were created, and the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was signed.
The Agreement focused on reducing the flow of nutrients, primarily phosphorous. The Agreement gave momentum to upgrading sewage treatment throughout the basin, eliminating phosphorus-based household detergents, and setting up elaborate systems for monitoring and controlling what was coming out of the thousands of industrial and municipal outflow pipes. The governments also recognized that controlling deliberate discharges, so-called ‘point sources’, would never be enough to protect water quality and they asked the IJC to investigate the broader and more politically difficult problem of pollution that resulted from activities on the land such as farming and urban development that produced runoff of nutrients or ‘non-point’ pollution.
The IJC created an ‘expert group’ known as, the Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group (PLUARG). PLUARG undertook a large bi-national study involving more than 200 scientists and other experts. It quickly understood that if the problems of pollution from run-off and poor land-use activities were to be effectively addressed, it had to go beyond science and engineering to tackle the technology and policies that encouraged poor land-use practices. It also had to move from its investigations from the lake upstream to the watershed including the rivers and small streams affected by forest practices, mining, urban development, and suburban sprawl. A watershed and ecosystem approach was needed. Doing this would require broad public support and, for the first time, the IJC invited and encouraged public participation at a series of public hearings around the basin, which became at the same time a massive effort to educate the public on the causes and solutions to the Great Lakes water quality crisis. Participants and observers credit PLUARG for stimulating the emergence of a bi-national Great Lakes community, the beginnings of a constituency for Great Lakes clean-up, and the political will to make the politically difficult and expensive changes that environmental protection would require.510 Thus as early as 1972 the essential components needed for Governance for Sustainability were identified as active public participation, ecosystem-based management, multi-jurisdictional collaboration, and a shared sense of responsibility for stewardship by the people and their leaders. What was and is necessary is an understanding that one's actions, even when they may appear to be local and isolated, occur within and affect a broader set of ecological relationships known as the Great Lakes ecosystem. While many people who had been involved in PLUARG reported it to be a ground-breaking success, they also reported discouragement when the U.S. and Canadian governments ignored most of the recommendations in the final report.511
The 1972 Agreement required that the governments undertake a comprehensive review of the Agreement's ‘operation and effectiveness’ after the first five years. Monitoring showed that phosphorus levels were in rapid decline. At the same time concern was growing about chemical pollution, particularly after the highly charged events of Love Canal, N.Y. near the Niagara River highlighted how chemical wastes from the huge expansion of industrial production in the 1950s and 1960s had been recklessly dumped in waterways and buried in landfills and were steadily making their way into the tributaries and lakes and turning up in the flesh of fish, fish-eating birds, and mammals. The 1972 Agreement had given a boost to Great Lakes science and information about contaminant levels in fish and fish-eating birds and mammals was filling scientific journals and eventually the popular press. Many of these compounds were being identified as carcinogens, neurotoxins, and other chemicals that damaged the reproductive and the chemical messaging systems of fish, mammals, and potentially humans. The momentum from early successes of the Agreement and the steady revelations of new and eve- more-complex-pollution issues in the lakes, quickly led to a major revision of the Agreement. The 1978 revisions added several features most relevant to Governance for Sustainability. The United States and Canada made far-reaching commitments to an ‘ecosystem approach’ to management based on the philosophy of zero discharge of persistent, bio-accumulative toxic substances. The purpose of the Agreement was changed from protecting and restoring ‘water quality in the Great Lakes System’ to restoring and maintaining ‘the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem’, an expansion of scope that created the potential for a new kind of environmental governance, one that would require increased collaboration, public participation, and shared responsibility.
Following the signing of the revised Agreement in 1978, Great Lakes governance began a period of increased activity. Members of the IJC's Water Quality Board, however, were frustrated by lack of progress in cleaning of up specific geographic locations. New information on atmospheric and sediment sources of contaminants to the Great Lakes food web and human health were emerging. The 1985–1986 review of the Agreement, resulted in amendments to the 1978 protocol in 1987. Local clean-up plans, known as ‘remedial action plans’, for 42 of the most heavily polluted areas were being drawn up by partnerships of local, state/provincial' and federal environmental officials; citizen activists; and local professionals. Multi-jurisdictional collaborations were drawing up lakewide management plans to achieve the Agreement's objectives in each lake. Environmental coalitions and advocacy groups were mobilizing supporters to get involved in IJC institutions culminating with more than 2,000 people registering for the IJC's biennial meeting in Windsor, Ontario in 1993. The institutional infrastructure was in place and in many ways thriving, Great Lakes issues were being widely covered in the region's press, and the U.S. Congress amended the Clean Water Act for the purpose of:
achiev[ing] the goals embodied in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement ... by funding of state grants for pollution control in the Great Lakes Area, and improved accountability for implementation of such agreement.512
Presumably this amendment was intended to provide more clout in U.S. federal law for commitments made in an otherwise non-binding agreement with Canada. Canada similarly spurred implementation through a formal agreement between the federal government and the province of Ontario clarifying roles and responsibility for Great Lakes programs through routine renewals of collaborative commitments under the Canada-Ontario Agreement Respecting the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem, first signed in 1971.
However by the early 1990s the Great Lakes institutions were mired in controversy and inaction over how to address the significantly more complicated, and to some more urgent, policy challenge posed by a steady flow of new evidence linking a broad range of wildlife health effects with increasingly similar human heath effects to exposure to toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes environment. The most significant chemicals were PCBs, dioxin, and other chlorinated organic compounds either directly produced by or the by-products of industry and agriculture. Theo Colborn, a scientist at the World Wildlife Fund pulled together threads of evidence from both wildlife and human health studies and made a compelling case that the accumulating data showed a chemical disruption of endocrine functioning, the body's chemical messaging system, that was eroding the vitality, and in some cases the viability, of exposed organisms. This degradation of the health of whole populations was just as, and perhaps more, important than any cause-effect linkages between any specific exposure and individual illness. It was the very definition of a decline in biological integrity. Yet despite the apparent potential for a new kind of shared environmental governance compatible with this project's notion of Governance for Sustainability, shortly after an apex of activity related to the Agreement, Great Lakes governance seemed to enter a steep decline in activity and effectiveness. What happened?
A number of explanations can be offered as to why Great Lakes governance, shortly after what had appeared to be a period of incredible energy and government commitment, experienced a decline in activity and effectiveness. These include in no particular order:
Ideological change. Beginning in 1981 with the presidency of Ronald Reagan and premiership of Brian Mulroney, political sentiment in both countries took a decidedly conservative turn, at times hostile to the core premise of federal activism in environmental protection. In addition both leaders appointed commissioners with little Great Lakes knowledge or experience and left Commission positions unfilled for long periods. The Reagan administration began what would become the politicization of appointments of commissioners. It also disbanded the Great Lakes Basin Commission that had been a source of funding for many of the studies that had uncovered the sources of and suggested solutions for Great Lakes pollution.513
Matching actions to the scale of the problems. Although there is still a need for governance at the ecosystem scale, many advocates and policy makers came to recognize that persistent organic pollutants (POP) were a global problem that required a global response. Greenpeace's Great Lakes office closed and the organization's leadership turned its attention to the international effort to conclude a POPs treaty. Similarly, the appropriate scale for the hands-on work of restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem is at the local level where thousands of ‘Friends of’ organizations, local conservancies, beach stewards, and so on, represent a substantial and knowledgeable constituency actively engaged in clean-up and maintenance.
Shift from IJC to BEC. In hopes of improving accountability, the 1987 amendments to the Agreement shifted the assessment of progress and ecosystem response to management actions from the IJC to a new institution, the Binational Executive Committee (BEC), through which the U.S. and Canadian governments were to coordinate their implementation activities. Lee Botts and Paul Muldoon in their study of the history of the Agreement report that the agencies represented in BEC are unlikely to engage in self-evaluation, since observers report a shift from a ‘mutual search for solutions’ frame of mind that formerly existed in the WQB [IJC Water Quality Board] to that of ‘negotiation on the common position to be presented to the IJC in the BEC.514
SOLEC. From the beginning of the Agreement, the IJC biennial meetings had been the place where the Great Lakes community came together to discuss progress or lack thereof in achieving Agreement objectives. With the creation of the BEC, the governments focused instead on a biennial State of the Great Lakes Ecosystem Conference (SOLEC) that reported on a suite of indicators only loosely if at all designed to report on the specific commitments in the Agreement. The Conference's reluctance to link its data to the effectiveness of specific policies turned off many activists who decided not to participate.
Government downsizing and retreat from environmental programs. Throughout the 1990s, spending for environmental monitoring, surveillance, remediation, and prevention was severely cut. Environment Canada's ‘program review’ shrank investments in Great Lakes programs. The conservative administration in Ontario in the early 1990 cut the Ontario Ministry of Environment funding by roughly 40 percent and invoked even deeper cuts to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. Several of the Great Lakes states were facing financial hardship and the U.S. EPA reduced funding for Great Lakes programs to the state agencies. The capacity for achieving the purpose of the agreement was crippled.
Unclear definitions of the ecosystem approach. Even though the Agreement's adoption of the ecosystem approach to management was clearly meant to promote an awareness of the ecological processes that determine water quality and a recognition that pollution in the open waters were directly related to activities on the land and throughout the ecosystem, the approach was often interpreted in ways that shifted attention away from the achievement of water-quality objectives.515 For example, at times industry representatives would argue that the ecosystem approach meant that issues of habitat restoration and exotic species were more important than the presence of persistent toxic chemicals. With the emergence of SOLEC, water quality became one of several sets of indicators reflecting the state of the lakes along with land use, habitat, fisheries and so on.
Failure to update and keep relevant. While article X of the Agreement calls for a comprehensive review and possible revision every six years, more than two decades have passed between the last comprehensive review and opportunity to negotiate changes and the 2006 – 2007 review and possible renegotiation. During that time many government officials and nearly all Great Lakes activists believed that reopening the agreement would risk allowing conservative regimes in each country to retreat from its most far-reaching commitments and statements of purpose and principles. Others argued that the Agreement already contained adequate measures to regularly update it and keep it relevant but the governments had failed to use those mechanisms.
Activist IJC – The IJC, like all institutions created by intergovernmental agreement, is sometimes caught between its responsibility to serve the governments that created it and its need to develop its own public constituency that can create the political will necessary to act on its recommendations. From PLUARG on, the IJC, whether by choice or because of the nature of the institutions the Agreement had created, has actively helped build a bi-national constituency for action on the Great Lakes. Environmental activists began to look to the IJC to make far-reaching recommendations. One such recommendation, that the governments should ‘develop timetables to sunset the use of chlorine and chlorine-containing compounds as industrial feedstock’516 prompted strong opposition from the chemical industry and ridicule from many career bureaucrats who believed the recommendation could not be considered politically serious. The reaction was a setback for those who believed that the regulatory processes in both countries, based as they were on a chemical-by-chemical, innocent-until-proven-guilty risk assessments had clearly failed to protect the lakes. Half of the 362 synthetically produced chemical compounds found in the Great Lakes at the time of the sun-setting recommendation were chlorinated organics.517
Given this history of high expectations and more modest achievements, the Great Lakes community now faces an important opportunity to revitalize or redesign Great Lakes governance. The U.S.-Canada Binational Executive Committee has completed its review of the Agreement (available at binational.net/glwqa_2007_e.html) and the two governments may or may not decide to revise the existing Agreement or re-negotiate a new one. At the time of this writing, no decisions have been made. The current period of uncertainty offers a real opportunity to revitalize Great Lakes governance.
Several workshops and expert analyses undertaken by scholars, activists, and the IJC have recommended changes in the Great Lakes governance system.518 Although they differ in a number of details, they converge on a number of features that would help build a governance framework around a set of clear responsibilities with means for concerned citizens to hold governments accountable. These include:
Mechanisms for representation of First Nations and Native communities on the IJC at both the level of Commissioner and in Advisory Board membership;
Regular reporting on progress in achieving the objectives of the Agreement with indicators directly related to specific commitments;
Independent third-party review of science reported by the Agencies for the purpose of tracking progress under the Agreement;
Provisions for citizen petition for redress for harms to the environment;
Direct reporting by the IJC to Congress and Parliament, in addition to the current practices of reporting the U.S. State Department and the Canadian Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade;
Regular updating of key provisions, ecosystem objectives, and priority pollutants;
Methods for sub-national governments to share responsibility for the implementation of the Agreement; and
A renewed commitment to bi-nationalism through the mutual search for solutions.
Now in its fourth decade, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has continued to serve as a kind of covenant between the people of this vast region and the freshwater ecosystem that defines it. Even the fact that the Agreement has disappointed many is a testament to the ambitious ecological commitments at its heart. In its early years, actions growing out of the Agreement led to significant improvements in water quality, greatly expanded scientific understanding of freshwater ecosystems, and created a dynamic bi-national system of ecologically based governance with strong elements of public participation and an emerging sense of mission based on protecting and restoring the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. It is not surprising that such a far-reaching commitment to pollution prevention, virtual elimination, and ecological responsibility would falter as it came up against the limitations of the environmental governance that dominated in both countries. The early successes in improving the most noticeable near-shore pollution led to a period of complacency and ultimately inaction in preventing the continued degradation of the ecosystem. Revisiting and perhaps revising the Agreement now creates the opportunity to highlight specific examples of where the current governance system has failed to deliver on the promises written into the Agreement and to bolster Great Lakes governance with new institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the obstacles to full implementation. Currently funding, regulation, and policy making in general are disconnected from the needs of the Agreement. Realignment of the instruments in both countries to achieve the purpose of the Agreement will require political will but can result in a strengthened regime of accountability. Improvements among the many institutions and levels of government involved in the Agreement could generate leadership with the following capabilities:
Ability to articulate a shared vision;
Set goals and priorities;
Re-establish moral authority;
Undertake bi-national strategic planning;
Mobilise responsibility and action; and
Manage conflict and enable effective representation.
The people responsible for evaluating the current state of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement would do well to remember the ecological and political context within which the agreement was originally negotiated as well as considering its current challenges. We have learned many important lessons from the Agreement's successes as well as its failures. With the changing ecological dynamics triggered by climate change we now face a period of heightened uncertainty and vulnerability. The future of the Great Lakes depends on governance that mobilizes the commitment, intelligence, and skills of all those who live and work in the Great Lakes. The first Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement achieved considerable success. It's now time to take the next step.
Bails, J. et al. 2005 ‘Prescription for Great Lakes Ecosystem Protection and Restoration: Avoiding the Tippping Point of Irreversible Changes’ www.healthylakes.org/news-events/2006/05/07/report-prescription-for-great-lakes-ecosystem-protection-and-restoration [March 2008].
Botts, L and Muldoon P. ‘Evolution of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’ (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, MI, 2005).
DePinto, J. and Manno, J. ‘Proposed Chlorine Sun setting in the Great Lakes Basin: Policy Implications for New York State’. Monograph 11 Donald Rennie Monograph Series (Great Lakes Program: University at Buffalo, 1997).
Gilbertson, M. ‘Living with Great Lakes Chemicals: Complementary Strategies and Cross-Paradigm Reconciliation’ 2000 Ecosystem Health 6 (1): pp. 24–38. [CrossRef]
International Joint Commission 1978 ‘Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’ www.epa.gov/glnpo/glwqa/1978/index.html [March 2008].
International Joint Commission Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution from Land.
Use Activities ‘Annotated Bibliography’ ( IJC: Windsor, ON,1979).
International Joint Commission ‘Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin from Land Use Activities, Summary’ (IJC: Windsor, ON March 1980).
International Joint Commission ‘Sixth Biennial Report Under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978’ (IJC: Windsor, ON 1992).
Manno, J. ‘Advocacy and Diplomacy: NGOs and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’ in Princen, T and Finger, M. (eds.) Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, New York and London, 1994).
Moore, S. 2004. ‘The Secrets Behind PLUARG’. Workgroup on Implementation, Great Lakes Commission, Great Lakes Nonpoint Source Pollution from Land Use Workshop: A Post-PLUARG Review. Ann Arbor, MI. www.glc.org/postpluarg/ [November 8–9, 2004].
506 Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at the State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry in Syracuse, New York, United States.
507 Professor and Director of the Dofasco Centre for Engineering and Public Policy at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
508 Bails, J. et al, 2005 ‘Prescription for Great Lakes Ecosystem Protection and Restoration: Avoiding the Tippping Point of Irreversible Changes’ www.healthylakes.org/news-events/2006/05/07/report-prescription-for-great-lakes-ecosystem-protection-and-restoration [March 2008].
509 Many Native people of the region assert that their peoples have lived sustainably within the community of life since ‘the dawn of time’.
510 International Joint Commission 1980 ‘International Joint Commission Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution from Land Use Activities 1979’. Manno, J. ‘Advocacy and Diplomacy: NGOs and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’ In Princen, T. and Finger, M. (eds.) Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge: New York and London, 1994). Moore, S. 2004. ‘The Secrets Behind PLUARG’. Workgroup on Implementation, Great Lakes Commission, Great Lakes Nonpoint Source Pollution from Land Use Workshop: A Post-PLUARG Review. Ann Arbor, MI [November 8–9, 2004] available at www.glc.org/postpluarg/
511 Moore, S. 2004. ‘The Secrets Behind PLUARG’. Workgroup on Implementation, Great Lakes Commission, Great Lakes Nonpoint Source Pollution from Land Use Workshop: A Post-PLUARG Review. Ann Arbor, MI. www.glc.org/postpluarg/ [November 8–9, 2004].
512 U.S. Clean Water Act, Section 118 a, 2.
513 Botts, L. and Muldoon, P. ‘Evolution of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’(Michigan State University Press: East Lansing, MI, 2005), p. 75.
514 Ibid., p. 103.
515 Gilbertson, M. ‘Living with Great Lakes Chemicals: Complementary Strategies and Cross-Paradigm Reconciliation’ 2000 Ecosystem Health Vol.6, No.1, pp. 24–38.
516 International Joint Commission ‘Sixth Biennial Report Under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978’ 1992.
517 DePinto, J. and Manno, J, ‘Proposed Chlorine Sun setting in the Great Lakes Basin: Policy Implications for New York State’ Monograph 11 Donald Rennie Monograph Series (Great Lakes Program: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1997).
518 IJC special report to the Governments of Canada and the Unites States, ‘Advice to Governments on the Review of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’, August 2006; Krantzberg, Manno, J., and de Boer , report on an Expert Workshop on Great Lakes St. Lawrence River Governance, 2007; Botts, L., and Muldoon, Wingspread Conference on the Great Lakes. Water Quality Agreement 2006; Agreement Review Committee, ‘Report to the Binational Executive Committee on the Review of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 2007’; Workshop on the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Governance and Institutions for the Agreement Review Committee, 2007; Council of Great Lakes Industries, ‘Building a Sustainable Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement’, 2007; Canadian Environmental Law Association, ‘The Future of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: The ENGO Perspective’, 2007.
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